Are all management earnings forecasts created equal? expectations management versus communication by Kim, Yongtae & Park, Myung Seok
Santa Clara University
Scholar Commons
Accounting Leavey School of Business
12-2012
Are all management earnings forecasts created
equal? expectations management versus
communication
Yongtae Kim
Santa Clara University, y1kim@scu.edu
Myung Seok Park
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/accounting
Part of the Accounting Commons
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11142-011-9178-z.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Leavey School of Business at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Accounting by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Yongtae, and Myung Seok Park. "Are All Management Earnings Forecasts Created Equal? Expectations Management versus
Communication." Review of Accounting Studies 17.4 (2011): 807-47.
   
 
 
 
 Are all management earnings forecasts created equal? 
Expectations management versus communication   
 
 
 
 
 
Yongtae Kim* 
Leavey School of Business 
Santa Clara University   
500 El Camino Real 
Santa Clara, CA 95053 
y1kim@scu.edu 
 
 
Myung Seok Park 
School of Business 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
301 W. Main St. 
Richmond, VA  23284-4000 
mspark@vcu.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author: Tel.: (408) 554-4667; Fax: (408) 554-2331  
                                         Email: y1kim@scu.edu (Yongtae Kim) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent studies associate management earnings forecasts (MEFs) with expectations management. 
These studies, however, neither provide evidence on the extent and scope of expectations 
management through MEFs nor consider alternative incentives for issuing MEFs. Consequently, 
existing evidence does not help regulators assess whether MEFs effectively facilitate 
communication with investors. We investigate to what extent managers exploit their earnings 
forecasts as a tool of expectations management or as a communication device. By examining 
relations among MEFs, analysts’ forecasts, and actual earnings, we classify MEFs into three 
incentive categories: (1) expectations management, (2) communication, and (3) other incentives. 
We find that a significant proportion (approximately 45 percent) of MEFs is issued to convey 
accurate earnings information to the market (that is, communication incentive). We also find that 
the fraction of MEFs for the expectations-management incentive increases post-Regulation Fair 
Disclosure. The evidence from examination of the various managerial motives for each incentive 
category supports our classification. Additional analysis using alternative classifications based 
on bad/good news and pessimistic/optimistic forecasts reveals that our proposed classification of 
MEFs works better in defining expectations management than these other classifications. This 
implies that more caution is warranted in defining expectations management when investigating 
the association between managerial motives and incentives for issuing MEFs.     
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 1 Introduction 
It is often alleged that firms and analysts are involved in an earnings-guidance game. As 
key providers of information to financial analysts, managers who voluntarily disseminate 
information regarding earnings expectations often deliberately attempt to affect analysts’ 
earnings projections. Prior studies (Bartov et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Richardson et al. 2004) 
document expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ earnings targets. More recent 
studies (Cotter et al. 2006; Baik and Jiang 2006) suggest that management earnings forecasts 
(MEFs), an explicit form of management guidance, are used for expectations management. Not 
all MEFs, however, are likely to be motivated by expectations management.  
MEFs are a valuable tool for a firm to communicate its earnings projections to market 
participants. Prior empirical studies (for example, Pownall and Waymire 1989; King et al. 1990; 
Skinner 1994, 1997; Frankel et al. 1995; Coller and Yohn 1997; Noe 1999) employ MEFs as a 
proxy for voluntary disclosure, assuming that managers communicate private information with 
investors through MEFs and that managers have an incentive to disclose truthful information. Prior 
literature suggests that firms communicate with investors to address problems arising from stock-
price volatility and mispricing resulting from disagreement among investors (Diether et al. 2002; 
Chen et al. 2002; Rogers et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011). Given that both expectations management 
and communication can be achieved through MEFs, it is an interesting research question to 
investigate how predominantly MEFs are issued for expectations management and for 
communication, respectively. Therefore, our primary objective in this study is to examine the 
extent to which MEFs are employed as a vehicle of expectations management and as a 
communication device. 
By examining MEF forecast error, news conveyed by MEFs, and analyst forecast error 
prior to MEFs, we classify MEFs based on three possible incentives for issuing them: (1) 
 2
expectations management to meet or beat market expectations at the time of the actual earnings 
announcement, (2) communication to convey credible earnings information to analysts and 
investors, and (3) other incentives (hereafter, Other).   
We find that, although the proportion of MEFs issued for expectations-management 
incentives is slightly greater than that for communication incentives, a significant proportion 
(about 45 percent) of MEFs is issued to convey accurate earnings information to the market (that 
is, communication incentive). Our results show that the fraction of MEFs for an expectations-
management incentive increases following the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). It 
might be the case that, in the post-Regulation FD era, incentives to use MEFs for expectations 
management become stronger partially because the regulation restricts implicit guidance.  
We further examine characteristics of MEFs with three different incentives. We find that 
the likelihood of beating or meeting the final consensus analysts’ forecasts is significantly higher 
for the expectations-management incentive category compared with the other incentive groups. 
This evidence supports the validity of our classification. The results show that an MEF based on 
the expectations-management incentive is not necessarily less accurate while it may achieve its 
goal of dampening analysts’ forecasts. We also present evidence that MEFs motivated by the 
communication incentive improve the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts more significantly than 
MEFs with other incentives. We find that improvement in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts is 
less pronounced following the passage of Regulation FD.   
We also examine the relations between three different incentives for issuing MEFs and 
managerial motive, such as equity offerings and insider selling. Using logistic regression 
analyses, we find evidence that insider selling shortly after an earnings announcement is 
significantly positively associated with expectations management, lending further support to our 
classification. This positive association between managerial motive and expectations 
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management is consistent with prior literature (Matsumoto 2002; Richardson et al. 2004) that 
defines expectations management based on analysts’ forecasts. We also find that analysts’ 
forecast dispersion and stock-price volatility are positively associated with communication MEFs, 
a finding consistent with prior literature on voluntary disclosures. Additional analysis using 
alternative classifications based on bad/good news and pessimistic/optimistic forecasts suggests 
that our proposed classification of MEFs based on three incentives produces results that are more 
consistent with motivations for expectations management than a classification based simply on 
either bad/good news or pessimistic/optimistic forecasts. This implies that we need to be more 
cautious in defining expectations management when investigating the association between 
managerial motives and incentives for issuing MEFs.     
This study contributes to and complements existing research in several ways. First, our 
study provides evidence on how frequently MEFs are issued for expectations-management 
incentives. Although a number of recent studies associate MEFs with expectations management, 
little research directly presents the extent to which MEFs are issued to manage earnings 
expectations or to communicate accurate earnings information to investors. Second, by 
proposing different potential incentives for MEFs, our study has implications for policy setting. 
Prior studies do not directly address how prevalently MEFs are used for expectations 
management or as a communication incentive. Hence, existing evidence is not enough to help 
regulators assess whether MEFs are effective in facilitating communication with investors. If 
MEFs are frequently employed as a form of expectations management and this practice is 
widespread, then tougher regulations on MEFs would be warranted.1 If MEFs are used primarily 
to communicate managers’ private information about upcoming earnings releases to the market, 
however, then policies that encourage more MEFs (and other forward-looking information 
                                                 
1 Baik and Jiang (2006) suggest that the Safe Harbor Act should be revised. 
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releases) would be more appropriate. Finally, our study adds value to the voluntary-disclosure 
literature. Prior research uses MEFs as a proxy for voluntary disclosure based on the assumption 
that managers have an incentive to convey credible information. If MEFs are used primarily for 
expectations management and are not credible, then it might be inappropriate to use them as a 
voluntary disclosure proxy. We also need to be more careful about incentives related to 
expectations management when we use MEFs as a proxy for voluntary disclosure.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the research issues in 
Section 2 and the data and sample selection in Section 3. We present our empirical analyses in 
Section 4. Section 5 presents the summary and conclusions. 
 
2 Research issues 
Managers are likely to attempt to avoid negative earnings surprises, because such 
surprises generally lead to negative price revisions. Skinner and Sloan (2002) document that the 
absolute magnitude of the price response to negative surprises significantly exceeds the price 
response to positive surprises. Thus, managers have a strong incentive to avoid negative 
surprises by either managing earnings upward or guiding earnings expectations downward 
(Matsumoto 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005).  
Prior studies suggest that managers manipulate earnings to meet or beat market 
expectations (Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Roychowdhury 2006). Another 
way to meet or beat analysts’ expectations is to guide those expectations downward to a level that the 
firm can meet or beat. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) claim that MEFs are issued primarily to adjust 
prevailing market expectations toward management’s beliefs about future earnings.2 Recent studies 
                                                 
2 Based on a survey by the Conference Board, Ajinkya and Gift (1984) provide the following reasons for a direct 
management forecast: (1) to minimize problems related to allowing analysts’ unrealistic forecasts to prevail in the 
market, (2) to reduce the unequal access to private information enjoyed by a subset of shareholders and analysts, (3) 
to maintain good relationships with analysts, and (4) to enhance the firm’s ability to raise new capital.  
 5
(Bartov et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Richardson et al. 2004) provide evidence that managers guide 
analysts’ earnings expectations downward to avoid negative earnings surprises at the actual earnings 
announcements.3 Matsumoto (2002) investigates the characteristics of firms exhibiting evidence of 
strategic guidance. Her findings indicate that firms with higher growth prospects, higher institutional 
ownership, and greater litigation risks are more likely to guide analysts’ forecasts to be at or below 
the level that managers expect to achieve. Richardson et al. (2004) find that analysts first issue 
optimistic earnings forecasts and then “walk down” their estimates to a level that firms can 
subsequently beat at the official earnings announcements. They also find that the walk-down to 
beatable targets is more pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings 
announcement. 
More recent research associates expectations management with the most explicit form of 
management guidance, MEFs. Cotter et al. (2006) and Baik and Jiang (2006) suggest that 
managers use MEFs opportunistically for expectations management. McKay (2007), however, 
casts some doubts on expectations management through MEFs. McKay reports that companies 
stand about the same chance of beating market expectations of earnings regardless of whether 
their executives issue guidance.4   
When the market expects a firm to perform better than its actual earnings represent, the 
firm can choose one of at least three options: (1) engage in earnings management to meet or beat 
the earnings target, (2) offer implicit guidance to lower expectations, or (3) provide explicit 
guidance to manage the market’s expectations downward. While MEFs are an explicit form of 
guidance, managers also can guide analysts implicitly by tipping analysts (at least prior to the 
                                                 
3 Bartov et al. (2002) suggest that firms that meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations enjoy a higher return than 
firms that fail to do so, even in cases where meeting or beating expectations is likely to have been achieved through 
expectations management. 
4 Specifically, based on Thomson Financial’s study, McKay (2007) reports that, between 2001 and 2006, Standard 
& Poor's 500 firms that issued guidance beat analysts' expectations 65 percent of the time, while firms that did not 
issue guidance beat them 63 percent of the time. 
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Regulation FD), or they can discuss future projects, product developments, and other information 
to communicate optimism or pessimism without issuing MEFs. Among the three options, MEFs 
are likely to be used as a last resort, because they bring the burden of meeting or beating the firm’s 
own forecasts, as well as increasing possible legal liability. In addition, the accuracy of 
management forecasts can be easily assessed afterwards by investors through actual reported 
earnings (Healy and Palepu 2001). Moreover, bad-news MEFs trigger negative market reactions at 
the time of announcements, and it is unclear whether this is more beneficial to a firm than a 
negative market reaction at the time of the actual earnings announcement. 
    MEFs have long been used as a proxy for voluntary disclosure in the literature. In particular, 
Pownall and Waymire (1989) argue that voluntary management forecasts are a timely mechanism for 
managers to convey relevant and credible information to the market. King et al. (1990) also contend 
that managers will credibly convey the precision of their forecasts to maintain a reputation for high-
quality disclosure.5 Prior literature suggests several motivations for managers to communicate with 
investors. Chen et al. (2011) show an increase in analysts’ forecast dispersion following firms’ 
decision to stop guiding. To the extent that dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts leads to 
mispricing of shares (for example, Diether et al. 2002), managers have an incentive to issue MEFs to 
reduce forecast dispersion, thereby mitigating the mispricing.6 Rogers et al. (2009) find that MEFs 
are associated with stock-price volatility, as they change investors’ views about the nature of the 
underlying firm, its management, or both. Voluntary disclosures such as MEFs are more useful when 
firm performance is variable and harder to predict. Prior studies present evidence that when stock 
returns are more volatile, analyst ratings of firms’ disclosures are higher (Lang and Lundholm 1993) 
and firms are more likely to include balance-sheet data in their press releases (Chen et al. 2002).  
                                                 
5 Other prior studies provide evidence that investors view voluntary management forecasts as credible information (for 
example, Hassell and Jennings 1986; McNichols 1989; Baginski and Hassell 1990; Hirst et al. 2007).   
6 We gratefully acknowledge this insight from an anonymous reviewer. 
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Prior literature also suggests that firms can lower their cost of capital by increasing 
disclosure of credible information (Verrecchia 1983; Diamond 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991). Botosan (1997), among others, presents empirical evidence that, for firms with low analyst 
following, there is a negative relation between the level of disclosure and their cost of capital. 
While prior literature focuses on a firm’s motivation to consistently maintain a higher level of 
voluntary disclosure to reduce cost of capital, MEFs can be issued rather sporadically. We note, 
however, that MEFs in recent periods become more regular.7  We observe that, although the 
number of firms issuing MEFs decreases in recent years, those that issue MEFs do so more 
consistently.   
Taking together recent studies on expectations management and earlier empirical studies on 
voluntary disclosure to convey credible information (that is, in the context of communication 
mechanism), it is an interesting research question to examine to what extent MEFs are issued as a 
tool of expectations management or as a communication device. Meanwhile, Regulation FD 
changes the way publicly listed firms release information to market participants. Specifically, this 
regulation reduces the amount of information disclosed selectively to analysts, yet increases the 
amount of information disclosed publicly. Although under previous rules, managers could disclose 
their assessments and forecasts of future results to only selected groups of analysts, under the new 
rules, all material information must be disclosed to the public simultaneously. Thus, Regulation FD 
is likely to have a significant impact on the disclosure environment, such as the frequency, 
accuracy, and role of MEFs, because it reduces managers’ implicit guidance to analysts, even 
                                                 
7 Following Rogers et al. (2009), we define a forecast as a regular (or consistent) forecast if, prior to the calendar 
quarter of the current forecast, the firm issued forecasts in at least three of the four preceding calendar quarters. 
Forecasts not meeting this criterion are defined as sporadic forecasts. We observe that, in our sample, about 42 
percent of forecasts over the 1995-2005 period are regular forecasts and that the proportion of regular forecasts 
increases in recent periods. Specifically, about 55 percent of forecasts for the 2001-2005 period are regular forecasts. 
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though it may not completely eliminate the practice.8 Therefore, it is an empirical question whether 
MEFs following the passage of Regulation FD are more opportunistic or credible.  
 
3 Data and sample selection 
The sample of MEFs is obtained from the Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) of Thomson 
Financial’s First Call Historical Database (FCHD). The CIG contains both quantitative and 
qualitative management forecasts. We collect all management forecasts of quarterly earnings per 
share (EPS) reported in the CIG from 1995 to 2005. Financial analyst forecast data are obtained 
from the First Call database, and stock prices and returns data are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We collect insider transaction data from Thomson 
Financial’s insider trading database and equity offering data from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) New Issue database. 
We retain only one-quarter-ahead forecasts. We eliminate forecasts if actual earnings or a 
stock price for the day prior to the MEF are not available. The final sample includes 25,705 
(23,347 quantitative) forecasts of quarterly earnings. Table 1 presents the frequencies of MEFs 
over time. Panel A reports the frequency of all MEFs issued by firms, and Panel B shows the 
number of firms issuing MEFs over time. Both the frequency of MEFs and the number of firms 
that issue MEFs significantly increase until 2001 (especially reaching a peak in 2001), and they 
decrease or remain stable beginning in 2002. This is consistent with recent practice in the 
forecasting environment, in which many firms no longer issue MEFs since the adoption of 
Regulation FD. The number of forecasts per firm, however, increases until 2004 and slightly 
decreases in 2005, indicating that remaining firms issue MEFs more frequently. It is noticeable 
                                                 
8 In the post-Regulation FD period, managers may issue more public guidance than private guidance (Cotter et al. 
2006). Chen and Matsumoto (2006) argue that, while Regulation FD reduces manager’s ability to privately 
communicate with analysts (for example, selectively providing or withholding information to different analyst 
groups), it does not reduce analysts’ incentive to generate private information. 
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that the percentage of qualitative forecasts steadily increases until 1998 and decreases after that 
year. In most recent years, especially in 2004 and 2005, MEFs reported in First Call’s CIG 
database are predominantly quantitative. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
Houston et al. (2010) argue that issuing quarterly earnings guidance caters to the whims 
of short-term investors, driving managers to accommodate these investors by engaging in 
myopic behavior that sacrifices the firm’s long-term performance. Some firms abandon quarterly 
earnings guidance in favor of annual earnings guidance or none at all and thus are changing how 
they communicate with investors.9 These changes in guidance practices coincide with calls from 
the investment community and academics (Fuller and Jensen 2002; Jensen et al. 2004; 
Krehmeyer and Orsagh 2006) to encourage managers to give up quarterly earnings guidance and 
hence avoid myopic managerial behavior caused by attempts to meet guided earnings numbers. 
However, prior literature presents evidence that giving up earnings guidance may harm both 
firms and the investment community. Chen et al. (2011) find that firms that stop issuing MEFs 
have poor trailing stock-return performance and lower institutional ownership. They also find 
that analysts’ forecast dispersion increases and forecast accuracy decreases following firms' 
decision to stop guiding, despite increased disclosures made in earnings press releases. Recently, 
Houston et al. (2010) document that earnings-guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and 
that stopping guidance benefits neither the stoppers nor their investors.10    
                                                 
9 In December 2002, the Coca-Cola Company announced that it would stop providing quarterly and annual EPS 
guidance to stock analysts, stating that the company hoped the move would focus investor attention on long-run 
performance. Shortly afterwards, several other firms, such as AT&T and McDonalds, made similar announcements 
and stopped issuing MEFs, especially for quarterly earnings. 
10 Houston et al. (2010) examine the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance, 
such as decreased earnings and missing analyst forecasts, is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance.    
 10
Table 2 reports the forecast errors of MEFs and consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to 
MEFs over time. Panel A presents the forecast errors of MEFs. We retain only quantitative 
forecasts and truncate the sample at the 1% and 99% of MEF errors to avoid the influence of 
outliers and data coding errors.11 MEF errors are measured as (Actual EPS – MEF)/P, where 
MEF is the management forecast of EPS, and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to 
MEF. The point estimate of earnings is used for MEF when management issues a point forecast. 
For range forecasts, we use the midpoint of the range. For minimum- and maximum-type 
forecasts, we use the disclosed lower or upper bound. Mean forecast errors are negative over the 
1995-2000 period. They are positive since 2001, however, indicating that managers tend to issue 
pessimistic forecasts after 2001. This trend of pessimistic MEFs may signal more expectations 
management in recent years.  
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
Panel B reports errors of consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to MEFs, measured as 
(Actual EPS – the last consensus analysts’ forecasts)/P, over time.12 As shown, mean analysts’ 
forecast errors prior to MEFs are relatively large until 2000 but become much smaller after 2000. 
This suggests that optimism in consensus analysts’ forecasts remains relatively stable until 2000 
and dramatically decreases from 2002 onward.     
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of selected variables for the full sample and the 
subsamples based on different classifications. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of selected 
variables for the full sample of management earnings forecasts. MEFE is management earnings 
forecast error, measured as (Actual EPS – MEF)/P. The positive (negative) value of MEFE 
means pessimistic (optimistic) MEF. ABSMEFE is the absolute value of MEFE. NEWS is MEF 
                                                 
11 From 23,347 quantitative forecasts, we lose 466 observations by truncating the sample at 1% and 99% of MEF 
errors. 
12 We lose an additional 96 observations because consensus forecasts prior to MEFs are unavailable. 
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news calculated as (MEF – Consensus Forecasts)/P, where Consensus Forecasts is the last 
consensus analysts’ forecasts of EPS prior to MEF, and P is the stock price at the end of the day 
prior to MEF. Consensus analysts’ forecasts are measured as median analysts’ forecasts. Positive 
(negative) value of NEWS indicates good (bad) news. B_AFE (A_AFE) is the forecast error of 
the last (first) consensus analysts’ forecasts before (after) MEF, measured as (Actual EPS –  
Consensus Forecasts)/P, where Consensus Forecasts is the last (first) consensus analysts’ 
forecasts of EPS before (after) MEF, and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to MEF. 
A positive (negative) value of B_AFE or A_AFE indicates pessimistic (optimistic) analysts’ 
forecasts. CHG_AFE is the change in analysts’ forecast errors before and after MEF, measured 
as A_AFE minus B_AFE. A positive (negative) value of CHG_AFE indicates lower (higher) 
analysts’ forecasts after MEF. ABSCHG_AFE is the change in the absolute value of analysts’ 
forecast errors before and after MEF, measured as the absolute value of A_AFE minus the 
absolute value of B_AFE. A positive (negative) value of ABSCHG_AFE indicates less (more) 
accurate analysts’ forecasts after MEF.13 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
The median value of MEFE is 0.0004, indicating that, in our sample, pessimistic 
forecasts are more frequent. Mean forecast news is negative (-0.0036). This result is consistent 
with prior literature (Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995), indicating that, on average, 
management forecasts are more pessimistic than consensus analysts’ forecasts, thereby 
delivering bad news to the market. This might be driven by the incentive for expectations 
management. Consistent with analysts following management forecasts, mean A_AFE is less 
negative than B_AFE, indicating that analysts become less optimistic following MEFs. The 
negative mean value of ABSCHG_AFE (-0.0032) indicates that the magnitude of the forecast 
                                                 
13 The number of observations for each variable varies, depending on the availability of data required to calculate it. 
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error of consensus analysts’ forecasts decreases following MEFs, which is consistent with a 
communication through MEFs.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for three subsamples, which are classified 
based on actual earnings meeting/beating versus missing final consensus analysts’ expectations 
before the earnings announcement. Mean and median values of MEFE are most positive for the 
beating subsample, slightly negative for the meeting subsample, and most negative for the 
missing subsample. This suggests that managers of beating-or-meeting-expectation firms tend to 
issue more pessimistic earnings forecasts than those of missing-expectation firms. The difference 
in MEFE is statistically significant between the beating (or meeting) and missing subsamples at 
the 1 percent level. The results show that missing-expectation firms issue worse forecast news 
than do beating-or-meeting-expectation firms. While mean values of NEWS for beating and 
meeting expectations are -0.0024 and -0.0034, respectively, the mean value of NEWS for the 
missing expectation subsample is -0.0081. These seemingly puzzling results may stem from the 
fact that consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to MEF, B_AFE are most optimistic for the 
subsample of firms missing expectations (mean B_AFE is -0.0120 for the missing-expectation 
subsample, -0.0008 for the beating-expectation subsample, and -0.0038 for the meeting-
expectation subsample, respectively). The change in the absolute value of analysts’ forecast 
errors, ABSCHG_AFE, is negative in all three subsamples, indicating that MEFs help improve 
the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts in general.   
Panel C of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on selected variables by initial analysts’ 
forecast optimism versus pessimism. The initial consensus analysts’ forecast is defined as 
optimistic if the first consensus forecast reported in the First Call database after the previous 
period earnings announcement is greater than actual EPS and pessimistic if it is less than actual 
EPS. As shown, mean MEFE is negative (positive) for the case of optimistic (pessimistic) initial 
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consensus forecasts. This evidence suggests that, when forming their expectations for a firm’s 
earnings, managers and analysts move together in the same direction. We observe that mean 
NEWS is negative (positive) for initial analyst forecast optimism (pessimism), meaning that 
MEFs are often issued to avoid overly optimistic or pessimistic analyst expectations. Meanwhile, 
the mean value of ABSCHG_AFE is negative across subsamples, indicating that analysts’ 
forecasts after MEFs are more accurate than those before MEFs in all cases. Improvement in 
analysts’ forecasts, however, is more pronounced in the case of initial analyst optimism (mean 
ABSCHG_AFE = -0.0011 for pessimistic subsample and -0.0056 for optimistic subsample). The 
mean and median differences in all variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Panel D of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on selected variables by the pre- versus 
post-Regulation FD periods. While the mean value of MEFE is negative in the pre-Regulation 
FD era (-0.0018), it is positive in the post-Regulation FD period (0.0006), indicating that MEFs 
become pessimistic in the post-FD period. During the same period, however, MEFs deliver 
relatively less bad news and analyst forecast errors are smaller. These seemingly conflicting 
results stem from the fact that analysts’ forecasts prior to MEFs are much more optimistic in the 
pre-FD period than in the post-FD period. The mean and median differences in all variables 
between pre- and post-Regulation FD periods are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In 
sum, results in Panel D suggest that by restricting managers’ ability to selectively provide 
information to analysts or withhold it from them, Regulation FD significantly affects the 
forecasting environment, thus enhancing the accuracy of both management’s and analysts’ 
forecasts. It is uncertain, however, whether this translates into more or less expectations 
management (or communication) in the post-FD period.   
  
4 Empirical analysis 
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4.1 Classification of MEFs into three possible incentive categories 
In this study, we propose three possible incentives for firms to issue MEFs: (1) 
expectations management, (2) communication to deliver credible earnings information to the 
market, and (3) other incentives (that is, Other), such as inducing higher market expectations 
prior to earnings announcements.  
We first classify MEFs that guide down consensus analysts’ forecasts and that are lower 
than actual earnings as expectations management. Second, if a MEF is more accurate than the 
existing consensus analysts’ forecasts while not being used for expectations management, it is 
classified into the communication incentive group. Third, if a MEF is higher than or equal to the 
consensus analysts’ forecasts and is also higher than actual earnings, we put it in the third 
incentive group, Other, as long as MEF is less accurate than the existing consensus analysts’ 
forecasts. This third group’s incentive is exactly the opposite of the expectations management 
incentive. That is, managers of firms may issue earnings guidance to induce higher market 
expectation prior to earnings announcements. This incentive group may include the cases in 
which firms’ equity offerings are scheduled before earnings announcements or managers intend 
to trade their shares following MEFs but prior to actual earnings announcements. In such cases, 
it would be in the managers’ best interest to encourage, not dampen, positive market expectations 
prior to actual earnings announcements. We formally state the conditions for the above three 
incentives as follows: 
1) Expectations management 
if MEF ≤ AF  &  MEF ≤ Actual but not MEF = AF = Actual 
 
2) Communication 
if (ABSMEFE < ABSAFE but not Expectations management) or (MEF = AF = Actual) 
 
3) Other 
if MEF ≥ AF  &  MEF > Actual, but not ABSMEFE < ABSAFE 
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where MEF is management earnings forecast; AF is the last consensus analysts’ forecasts;  
Actual is actual earnings at the earnings announcement; ABSMEFE is the absolute value of 
management earnings forecast error; and ABSAFE is the absolute value of the last consensus 
analyst forecast error.   
By examining news conveyed by MEFs, MEFs’ forecast error, analyst forecast error, and 
the relative accuracy of MEFs and analyst forecasts, we classify all MEFs further into 17 distinct 
cases. In Appendix A, we discuss details about the classification scheme and relate 17 cases to 
the three incentives. 
Table 4 reports the frequencies of MEFs by the three possible incentives.14 The second 
and third columns provide frequencies by each incentive category in our full sample. Our results 
reveal that the proportion of expectations management is only slightly greater than that of 
communication in the full sample period. Specifically, 10,905 (10,225) of 22,785 quarterly 
forecasts or 48 percent (45 percent) belong to the Expectations management (Communication) 
category in our sample. MEFs issued for Other incentives, such as to generate higher market 
expectations, are about 7 percent of the full sample MEFs. In sum, it appears that, although 
almost half of MEFs are used to adjust analysts’ forecasts downward (that is, expectation 
management), a significant portion of MEFs is issued to convey accurate earnings information to 
the market (that is, communication).  
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
The fourth through seventh columns of Table 4 present the frequencies of MEFs across 
the three possible incentives during the pre- and post-Regulation FD periods. As shown, the 
fraction of Expectations management increases during the post-Regulation FD period (from 
                                                 
14 See Table A-1 in Appendix A for detailed frequencies of MEFs by 17 cases. 
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45.73 percent to 48.72 percent). In contrast, the proportion of MEFs in the Communication 
category decreases during the same period (from 45.63 percent to 44.35 percent). This suggests 
that, though Regulation FD limits implicit guidance to analysts by blocking selective disclosure, 
managers use MEFs for expectations management more frequently to compensate for the loss of 
other ways to dampen analysts’ expectation (for example, through implicit guidance).   
The last four columns of Table 4 provide the frequencies of MEFs across the three 
possible incentives for the first versus final management forecasts. Sometimes a firm issues 
multiple MEFs for the same fiscal period. For the sample of firms issuing multiple MEFs, earlier 
studies use either the first (Rogers and Stocken 2005) or last MEF (Baik and Jiang 2006) for 
their analyses. Although the choice of the first or the last MEF depends on the research question 
in each study, if the first and last MEFs show different characteristics, we need to be careful in 
selecting the sample forecasts. We expect that as the earnings-announcement date approaches, 
the incentive for expectations management is greater. Consistent with our prediction, we find 
that the fraction of expectation management is greater in the final forecast (that is, 47.94 percent 
in first forecasts and 50.46 percent in final forecasts). In contrast, the proportion of 
communication incentive shrinks as earnings announcement gets closer (that is, 44.78 percent in 
first forecasts and 43.56 percent in final forecasts). Overall, results in the last four columns of 
Table 4 suggest that managers are more likely to engage in expectations management to drive 
down the market’s earnings projections as the earnings announcement draws near. 
 To examine this phenomenon more closely, we plot the relative frequency of MEFs by 
the three incentive categories over the forecast horizon. Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of 
MEF incentives. There are at least two alternative ways to categorize a set of MEFs as being 
issued as a tool of expectations management to meet or beat expectations. Baik and Jiang (2006) 
suggest that firms with incentives to meet or beat expectations tend to issue pessimistic MEFs 
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(that is, those that are lower than actual earnings). Pessimistic MEFs, however, might actually be 
higher than the existing consensus analysts’ forecasts that are already pessimistic. Alternatively, 
we may also define any MEF that is lower than the existing consensus analysts’ forecasts and 
therefore delivers bad news as those with expectations-management incentives to meet or beat 
expectations. However, if a bad-news MEF is still above actual earnings, it is difficult to argue 
that the MEF is motivated by the expectations-management incentive. We compare our 
classification of MEFs with the above-mentioned two alternative classifications, thereby 
providing the plots of the proportion of MEFs with expectation-management incentives based on 
the three different classification schemes.15  
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the plots of the relative proportion of MEFs classified as 
expectation management defined by bad-news MEF (that is,  MEF is lower than the existing 
consensus analysts’ forecasts). Panel B illustrates the plots of expectations management defined 
by pessimistic forecasts (that is, positive MEF errors). Panel C presents the patterns of the three 
incentive groups based on our proposed classification scheme. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
In Panel A, the patterns in expectation management defined by bad-news forecasts tend 
to fluctuate between approximately 55 and 70 percent of MEFs over time. The proportion of 
expectations management tends to increase up to four weeks before the earnings announcement 
and decrease after the second week prior to the announcement. In Panel B, the percentage of 
expectations management defined by pessimistic forecasts (that is, positive forecast error) 
decreases as the earnings announcement date draws near. The results in Panel B, however, cast 
doubt about classifying expectations management by pessimistic forecasts. We would expect an 
                                                 
15 Figure A-3 in Appendix A compares the classification of MEFs by the three incentives with other classifications 
based on bad/good-news and pessimistic/optimistic forecasts. 
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increase, not a decrease, in the propensity of expectations management toward the earnings 
announcement, as the incentive for expectations management becomes stronger.      
Panel C of Figure 1 illustrates the relative proportion of MEF incentives based on our 
classification scheme. As seen, the proportion of MEFs with expectations management defined 
by our proposed classification scheme increases from eight weeks to two weeks prior to the 
earnings announcement, although it decreases during the last two weeks before the earnings 
announcement. As one would expect, the proportion of the Other incentive decreases as the 
earnings announcement date gets closer, so that the window for any benefit from high-market 
expectations prior to the earnings announcement narrows.  
 
4.2 Meet/beat ratio, initial analyst optimism, forecast error, and changes in analyst forecast error 
across three incentives 
 
To examine the characteristics of MEFs in different categories, we present statistics of 
selected variables by three different incentives for issuing MEFs in Table 5. We show statistics 
for the full sample in Panel A, as well as for the pre and post-Regulation FD periods in Panel B. 
METBEAT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the actual EPS is greater than or 
equal to the last consensus analysts’ forecast prior to the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise, 
where consensus analysts’ forecast is defined as the median of analysts’ forecasts. The mean 
value of METBEAT for each incentive group therefore indicates the percentage of firms in each 
group that meets or beats the market expectation. I_AF_OP is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the initial consensus analysts’ forecast (that is, the first consensus forecast after the 
prior period earnings announcement) is optimistic (that is, greater than actual EPS) and 0 
otherwise, where the consensus forecast is defined as the median of analysts’ forecasts. The 
mean value of I_AF_OP for each incentive group indicates the percentage of optimistic initial 
consensus analysts’ forecasts. All other variables are defined earlier. 
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[Insert Table 5 here.] 
As shown in Panel A, the mean meet/beat ratio for Expectations management is 95 
percent and significantly higher than those for either the Communication or the Other incentive 
categories. These statistics support our classification of expectations-management incentive. 
Note that for the incentive classification, we use analyst’ forecast error prior to MEF and forecast 
error of MEF but not the forecast error of the final consensus forecast. Evidence on meet/beat 
ratios suggests that firms achieve their intended objectives (that is, meet or beat their earnings 
targets) when they issue MEFs for expectations management. 
Initial consensus analysts’ forecasts, in general, appear to be more optimistic in the case 
of the Other incentive group compared with Expectations management and Communication 
groups. The results also show that MEFs are pessimistic in the Expectations management 
category and optimistic in the Other incentive group. Specifically, the mean and median values 
of MEFE for the expectations-management group are 0.0019 and 0.0009, respectively, indicating 
pessimistic forecasts. The mean and median of MEFE for Other incentive category are negative, 
however, which represent optimistic forecasts. While the mean value of MEFE is negative, the 
median is zero for the Communication incentive category. We note that MEFs with Expectations 
management incentives are not necessarily less accurate. If managers do indeed manage earnings 
expectations to meet or beat the market expectation, they are likely to do so just across actual 
earnings. This, in turn, may result in a smaller forecast error. Consistent with this discussion, we 
find evidence that MEFs with expectations management are the most accurate, with the smallest 
absolute value of MEF error (mean ABSMEFE is 0.0019 for Expectations management, 0.0028 
for Communication, and 0.0060 for Other incentive). 
It is also noted that, for all incentive groups, the magnitude of analysts’ forecast error 
significantly decreases after management earnings forecasts are released, as evidenced by the 
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negative mean for ABSCHG_AFE in all incentive categories. This suggests that analysts quickly 
revise their earnings forecasts in response to earnings guidance, thereby reducing their forecast 
errors (Waymire 1986).16 As expected, an improvement in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts 
around an MEF is most evident in the Communication group, for which both mean and median 
values of ABSCHG_AFE are negative (mean = -0.0040 and median = -0.0012). 
Panel B of Table 5 shows statistics of the same variables for the pre- and post-Regulation 
FD periods. The mean meet/beat ratio significantly increases after the adoption of Regulation FD 
for both Expectations management and Communication categories (from 92 to 96 percent for 
Expectations management and from 61 percent to 81 percent for the Communication group). 
Both optimism in initial consensus analysts’ forecasts, I_AF_OP, and errors in consensus 
analysts’ forecasts, B_AFE and A_AFE, significantly decrease in the post-Regulation FD period. 
During the same period, the degree of optimism in MEFs tends to attenuate in the 
Communication and Other incentive categories (for example, in the Communication category, 
mean MEFE = -0.0034 in the pre-Regulation FD period and -0.0001 in the post-Regulation FD 
period). The degree of pessimism in MEF for the Expectations management, however, increases 
following the passage of Regulation FD. The results also show that improvement in the accuracy 
of analysts’ forecasts around MEFs is far less pronounced in the post-Regulation FD period. For 
instance, the mean value of ABSCHG_AFE for the Communication group is -0.0074 in the pre-
Regulation FD and -0.0030 in the post-Regulation FD period.  
In sum, although we find differences between pre- and post-Regulation FD periods as 
discussed above, the differences across incentive groups (for example, higher meet/beat ratio, 
more pessimistic MEF, and more accurate MEF in the Expectations management category; 
                                                 
16 Waymire (1986) finds that posterior analyst forecasts become more accurate after voluntary management earnings 
forecasts.   
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biggest improvement in analysts’ forecast accuracy in the Communication incentive category) 
are generally consistent across pre- and post-Regulation FD era. 
 
4.3 Equity offerings, insider trading, and three incentives for MEFs 
To discern whether managerial motives are associated with the three different MEF 
incentives, we examine incidences of equity offerings and insider-selling activities of forecasting 
firms. Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for equity offerings and insider selling by the three 
different incentive categories for issuing MEFs. Panel A of Table 6 presents statistics for the full 
sample, and Panel B reports them by the pre and post-Regulation FD periods. We measure 
incidences of equity offerings and insider net-selling in 30-day and 1-year periods after earnings 
announcements. EO_AF_30 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has 
common or preferred equity offerings between the earnings announcement date and 30 days after 
the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. EO_AF_1YR is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm has common or preferred equity offerings between the earnings 
announcement date and 1 year after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. SELL_AF_30 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if directors and officers are net sellers between 
the earnings announcement date and 30 days after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. 
SELL_AF_1YR is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if directors and officers are net 
sellers between the earnings announcement date and 1 year after the earnings announcement and 
0 otherwise.17 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
                                                 
17 Following Richardson et al. (2004), insiders include the CEO, chair, vice presidents, officers, and directors. We 
use the following relationship codes from the Thomson Financial database: “CB,” “D,” “DO,” “H,” “OD,” “VC,” 
“AV,” “CEO,” “CI,” “CO,” “CT,” “EVP,” “O,” “OB,” “OP,” “OS,” “OT,” “OX,” “P,” “S,” “SVP,” and “VP.”  
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As shown in Panel A of Table 6, incidences of equity issues are the greatest in the case of 
the Communication group, followed by the Expectations management group. Although the 
difference between these two incentive categories is statistically insignificant, incidences of 
equity issues in both incentive categories are significantly greater than those in the Other 
incentive category. We also find no significant difference in incidences of insider net-selling 
between the Expectations management and Communication categories.  
As shown in Panel B of Table 6, the results by the pre- and post-Regulation FD periods 
are qualitatively similar to the full sample results discussed above. Equity offerings 30 days after 
the earnings announcement are the greatest for Communication group. The difference between 
the Communication group and the Expectations management group, however, is statistically 
insignificant in both pre- and post-Regulation FD periods. In the next sub-section, we examine 
managerial motives for issuing MEFs in more detail, based on the multivariate analysis.  
 
4.4 Determinants of MEFs for three incentives   
 
 To further investigate which factors motivate managers to issue their forecasts as a tool of 
expectations management or as a communication device, we estimate the following cross-
sectional logistic regression model: 
Pr(MEF_INCENTIVE =1) = α0 + α1SELL_AF_30 + α2EO_AF_30 + α3 EO_BF  
+ α4 MB + α5MV + α6PROFIT + α7YEAR + α8R&D + α9LITG  
+ α10IMPLIT + α11CHEARN + α12LABINT + α13LT_CHEARN 
+ α14AFSTD + α15ARSTD + ε                            (1) 
 
where MEF_INCENTIVE = an indicator variable for the following three incentives for issuing  
MEFs: 
  EX_MGT = expectations management for meeting/beating earnings expectations,  
  COMM = communication, and 
       OTHER = incentives other than expectations management or communication; 
SELL_AF_30 = an indicator variable equal to 1 if directors and officers are net sellers 
between the earnings announcement date and 30 days after the earnings 
announcement and 0 otherwise; 
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EO_AF_30 = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has common or 
preferred equity offerings between the earnings announcement date and 30 days 
after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise; 
EO_BF= an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has common or preferred 
equity offerings between the MEF date and the day before the earnings 
announcement and 0 otherwise; 
MB= market-to-book equity at the end of the quarter prior to MEF; 
MV= logarithm of market value of equity at the end of the quarter prior to MEF; 
PROFIT = an indicator variable equal to 1 if actual EPS is positive and 0 otherwise;   
YEAR = time trend variable, defined as (MEF year-1995); 
R&D = R&D expense scaled by average total assets; 
LITG = industry dummy with high litigation risk based on 4-digit SIC industry code, 
such as 2833, 2836, 3570, 3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374;     
IMPLIT = industry dummy with high implicit claims based on 4-digit SIC industry code, 
such as 1500-1799, 2450-2459,2500-2599, 2830-2839, 3010-3019, 3240-3999;  
CHEARN = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the change in earnings from 
the same quarter in the previous year is positive and 0 otherwise;  
LABINT= labor intensity, measured as [1-(PPE/Gross Assets)] where PPE is gross 
property, plant, and equipment, and Gross Assets is (total assets + accumulated 
depreciation and amortization);  
LT_CHEARN = long-term change in earnings from 4 quarters prior to the forecast 
quarter to 4 quarters after the forecast quarter scaled by the market value of equity 
at 4 quarters prior to the forecast quarter;   
AFSTD = standard deviation of analyst forecasts included in the last consensus forecast 
prior to MEF; and 
ARSTD = standard deviation of abnormal stock returns prior to MEF, measured over 
trading days (-27 to -2) around MEF.  
 
 Richardson et al. (2004) find that the walk-down to beatable targets is most pronounced 
when the firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after earnings are released. Thus, to see 
whether incentives for issuing MEFs are driven by managerial motives to sell stock around an 
earnings announcement, we include two variables, SELL_AF_30 and EO_AF_30, as 
determinants of incentives for MEFs. Following Richardson et al., we also include equity 
offerings prior to the earnings announcement, EO_BF. 
 In addition, Richardson et al. (2004) describe the switch from initial analysts’ forecast 
optimism to final pessimism as a function of book-to-market ratio, market value of equity, profit, 
year, R&D expense, litigation risk, high implicit-claim industry, earnings change, labor intensity, 
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and long-term changes in earnings. To control for confounding effects, we include these 
variables in the logistic regression model.  
To examine incentives to issue MEFs for communication purpose, we include AFSTD 
and ARSTD in the model. The prior literature implies that managers have an incentive to issue 
MEFs to reduce forecast dispersion, thereby mitigating mispricing (Chen et al. 2011; Diether et 
al. 2002). Prior studies also suggest that firms are more likely to provide high quality voluntary 
disclosures when stock returns are more volatile (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Chen et al. 2002). 
  Table 7 presents the results using three incentives for issuing MEFs. In the second and 
third columns displaying the results using EX_MGT as a dependent variable, the coefficient on 
SELL_AF_30 is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that the likelihood of 
issuing MEFs for meeting/beating earnings targets is high when insider trading is intended 
shortly after earnings announcements. This is consistent with Richardson et al. (2004) and 
Matsumoto (2002). We find little evidence, however, that equity offerings motivate managers to 
issue their forecasts to walk-down market expectations. Turning to control variables, we find that 
some variables, such as PROFIT, YEAR, R&D, LITG, and LABINT, are positively and 
significantly associated with the likelihood of issuing MEFs for the purpose of expectations 
management. These results are consistent with those of Masumoto (2002) and Richardson et al. 
(2004), who define expectations management based on analysts’ forecasts, not management 
earnings guidance.  We also observe that the coefficients on AFSTD and ARSTD are negatively 
associated with EX_MGT, indicating that managers are less likely to issue guidance for 
expectations management when analysts’ forecast dispersion and stock-return volatility prior to 
MEFs are high. 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
 The fourth and fifth columns report the results using COMM as a dependent variable. We 
find that the coefficients on SELL_AF_30, EO_AF_30, and EO_BF are all insignificant after 
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controlling for other incentives and firm characteristics. Consistent with our prediction, the 
results show that the coefficients on AFSTD and ARSTD are significantly and positively 
associated with COMM, indicating that managers are more likely to communicate through MEFs 
when analysts’ forecast dispersion and stock-return volatility are high prior to MEFs.18  
  In the last two columns presenting the result using OTHER as a dependent variable, the 
coefficient on SELL_AF_30 is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that 
MEFs for Other incentives are less likely to be issued when the insider selling is scheduled 
shortly after earnings management. This is consistent with managers issuing their forecasts for 
alternative incentives, such as achieving higher market expectations prior to the earnings 
announcement. 
 
4.5 Managerial motives and alternative approaches to classify MEFs 
 To test the validity of our classification of MEFs for the three incentive categories and to 
compare the implications of using different strategies to classify MEFs associated with 
expectations management, we run logistic regression (equation (1)) with alternative definitions 
of MEF for expectations management. First, by comparing MEF with the last consensus 
analysts’ forecasts prior to MEF, we partition our MEFs into two categories, bad- and good-news 
forecasts, with bad-news forecasts representing expectations management.  
 Panel A of Table 8 reports results from the logistic regression when expectations 
management is defined by bad-news MEFs. If bad-news forecasts represent expectations 
management, we expect that the likelihood of bad-news forecasts is positively associated with 
                                                 
18 To gain further insights into the communication motive, we conduct a separate analysis on the short-term impact of 
MEFs on analysts’ forecast dispersion and stock-return volatility. Untabulated results show that stock-return volatility 
decreases after MEFs for the communication purpose, but this is not the case for the expectations-management motive. 
Although statistically insignificant, analysts’ forecast dispersion also decreases after communicating MEFs. In contrast, 
forecast dispersion increases after MEFs for the expectations-management incentive.  
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incidences of insider-selling and equity offerings after the earnings announcement. As shown, 
both SELL_AF_30 and EO_AF_30 are negatively associated with the likelihood of bad-news 
forecasts, which contradicts results in the prior literature (Masumoto 2002; Richardson et al. 
2004). They are also inconsistent with those reported in Table 7. This suggests that our 
classification of MEFs based on three incentives works better than the classification simply 
based on bad/good news forecasts in defining expectations management. This result also implies 
that we need to be more cautious in defining MEFs when we investigate the association between 
managerial motives and incentives for issuing MEFs.     
[Insert Table 8 here.] 
Baik and Jiang (2006) classify MEFs based on MEF error. They classify pessimistic 
MEFs (that is, those with positive forecast error) as being more likely to be issued for an 
expectations-management purpose. We run a logistic regression when expectations management 
is defined by pessimistic MEFs and report the results in Panel B of Table 8. If pessimistic MEFs 
represent expectations management, we should observe a positive association between 
pessimism in MEFs and incidences of insider selling and the incidence of equity offerings 
shortly after the earnings announcement.  Results in Panel B of Table 8 suggest that incidences 
of insider selling and equity offerings are positively associated with the probability of issuing 
pessimistic forecasts.  
Although this result lends some support to MEFs for the expectation-management 
purpose defined by pessimistic forecasts, the coefficients on other variables are inconsistent with 
this interpretation. Matsumoto (2002) argues that firms with higher ex ante litigation risk are 
more likely to take engage in expectations management. She finds the results consistent with this 
prediction. While the coefficient on LITG in Table 7 is positive and significant, that in Panel B 
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of Table 8 is negative and thus inconsistent with Matsumoto (2002). The positive coefficient on 
EO_BF is also questionable. If firms issue MEFs for the expectations management, this will 
dampen the current market expectation. This is detrimental for firms that plan to tap the capital 
markets before the earnings announcement, because these firms cannot reap the benefit of 
meeting/beating earnings targets and only bear the costs of lower market expectation prior to 
earnings announcements. Together with the downward trend of the proportion of pessimistic 
MEFs over the quarter in Panel B of Figure 1, these results cast doubt on the validity of 
classifying MEFs for expectations management simply based on pessimism/optimism in MEFs.19 
 
5 Summary and conclusion 
 
In this paper, by classifying management earnings forecasts (MEFs) into three incentive 
categories, we show the extent to which MEFs are motivated by expectations management and 
communication incentives. Our classification is based on examinations of forecast errors of both 
MEFs and consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to MEFs, news conveyed through MEFs, and the 
relative accuracy of MEFs and analysts’ forecasts. Specifically, we consider the following three 
incentives for issuing MEF: (1) expectations management to meet or beat market expectations at 
the time of the actual earnings announcement, (2) communication to convey managers’ private 
information about upcoming earnings releases to analysts and investors, and (3) incentives other 
than expectations management or communication (that is, Other). 
                                                 
19 It appears that the high correlation between changes in earnings (CHEARN) and forecast pessimism, rather than 
the expectations-management incentive, drives the results in Panel B of Table 8. If managers are overly influenced 
by unfavorable earnings from previous periods when they forecast current-period earnings, performance 
improvement in the current period may not be properly reflected in MEFs, leading to pessimistic MEFs, on average. 
When firms have better current financial performance (for example, positive CHEARN) and a profitable quarter (for 
example, positive PROFIT), they will have an incentive to issue equity to take advantage of the favorable timing. If 
managers act in their self-interest, they may also want to recoup capital gains by selling shares. In contrast, the 
opposite might be true for bad-news forecasts in Panel A of Table 7. Firms with deteriorating performance (for 
example, negative CHEARN) and a less profitable quarter will defer equity offerings and insider selling. Under this 
circumstance, managers are more likely to issue bad-news forecasts, much of which might be a genuine 
communication with investors about this unfavorable performance, rather than expectations management. 
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We present evidence that the proportion of MEFs issued for expectations management is 
comparable to that for communication incentives. We find that the fraction of MEFs for 
expectations management increases in the post-Regulation FD period. Our results also show that, 
contrary to common belief, expectations management through MEFs often occurs even when 
existing consensus forecasts are pessimistic (that is, when consensus analysts’ forecasts are 
already lower than actual earnings).   
We show that the likelihood of beating or meeting the final consensus analysts’ forecasts 
is disproportionately high for MEFs motivated by expectations management. For example, the 
mean value of the meet/beat ratio of MEFs associated with Expectations management for 
meeting/beating earnings targets is 95 percent, while the ratio of MEFs in the Communication 
category is 77 percent, and only 63 percent for Other incentives. We also find that improvement 
in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts around MEFs is less pronounced in the post-Regulation FD 
period. Our empirical results show that incidence of insider net-selling shortly after the earnings 
announcement is positively associated with expectations-management incentives, while analysts’ 
forecast dispersion and stock-return volatility prior to MEFs are positively associated with 
communication incentives. The association between managerial motives and incentives for 
issuing MEFs are less clear, however, when expectations management is defined based on other 
classification schemes, such as bad-news forecasts or pessimistic forecasts, lending support for 
the validity of our classification method.   
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Appendix A 
Classifying management earnings forecasts into 17 cases 
 
 
By examining the optimism/pessimism of analysts’ forecasts prior to MEFs, news 
conveyed by MEFs, MEFs’ forecast error, analyst forecast error, and the relative accuracy of 
MEFs and analysts’ forecasts, we classify all MEFs into 17 distinct cases. We then categorize 
these 17 cases into three incentive categories. We assume that managers consider the existing 
consensus analysts’ forecasts before making a decision on MEF. We further assume that, after 
observing the current consensus analysts’ forecasts, managers decide the following:   
1) whether to issue good- or bad-news forecasts, 
2) whether to issue optimistic or pessimistic management forecasts, and 
3) whether to issue more or less accurate forecasts compared with the existing consensus 
analysts’ forecasts 
For the classification, we construct a decision-tree template and then use it to classify 
MEFs. The decision-tree approach enables us to present our classification scheme in an intuitive 
manner. The steps involved in the construction of the classification scheme are as follows. First, 
MEFs are classified into three groups by optimism/pessimism in the consensus analysts’ 
forecast: (1) MEFs in which the consensus analysts’ forecast is optimistic, (2) MEFs in which the 
consensus analysts’ forecast is accurate (that is, zero forecast error), and (3) MEFs in which the 
consensus analysts’ forecast is pessimistic. MEFs are then partitioned based on forecast news, 
optimism/pessimism in management forecasts, and MEF error within the three groups above.  
Using the forecast error of the last consensus analysts’ forecasts before the MEF, B_AFE, 
we determine optimism/pessimism in consensus analysts’ forecasts. The positive (negative) 
value of B_AFE indicates pessimistic (optimistic) analysts’ forecasts. We identify the type of 
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MEF news based on NEWS, which is measured as the difference between MEFs and consensus 
analysts’ forecasts prior to MEFs. The positive (negative) value of NEWS indicates good (bad) 
news. Optimism/pessimism in MEFs is defined by management earnings forecast error, MEFE, 
where MEFE is measured as the actual EPS minus the management-earnings forecast. A positive 
(negative) value of MEFE means pessimistic (optimistic) MEFs. By comparing the absolute 
magnitude of MEFE and the absolute value of B_AFE, we determine ABSFEDIFF, which is the 
relative accuracy of the MEF. 
Figure A-1 shows the classification of management-earnings forecasts in a decision tree. 
In Figure A-1, decision nodes in bold characters represent the point where subsequent nodes are 
automatically determined (for example, when the consensus analysts’ forecasts are optimistic, a 
good-news MEF also means an optimistic and less accurate MEF (case 1)). 
These 17 cases are associated with three incentives discussed in the text as follows: 
1) Expectations management 
if MEF ≤  AF  &  MEF ≤  Actual but not MEF = AF = Actual: Cases 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 16, 17 
 
2) Communication 
if (ABSMEFE < ABSAFE but not Expectations management) or (MEF = AF = Actual): 
Cases 3, 9, 13, 14, 15 
 
3) Other 
if MEF ≥  AF  &  MEF > Actual, but not ABSMEFE < ABSAFE: Cases 1, 2, 8, 11, 12 
 
Figure A-2 summarizes our classification scheme of MEFs and shows the directions of 
four variables used to classify MEFs into the 17 cases and three incentive categories. Figure A-3 
shows an example for each case when actual earnings is $10 per share. Table A-1 shows 
frequencies of MEFs by 17 cases and three incentive categories. 
Figure A-3 also reveals the difference between our classification and the classification 
based on either bad/good news or pessimistic/optimistic MEFs. Based on bad/good news forecasts, 
cases 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 17 are classified as expectations management. Case 3 belongs to an 
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expectations-management category based on bad/good news but to a communication category in 
our classification scheme. In contrast, case 16 is classified as an expectations management group in 
our classification but excluded from the expectations-management category when it is classified by 
bad/good news forecasts. These are not trivial cases. Table A-1 shows that about 20 percent of 
MEFs belong to case 3 and about 6 percent of MEFs belong to case 16. In case 3, managements 
issue a MEF that is lower than the existing consensus forecast (that is, bad news) but higher than 
actual earnings. If a manager has an incentive for meeting or beating market expectation at the 
earnings announcement, she or he will issue forecasts lower than actual earnings to guide analyst 
forecasts down below actual earnings. Thus it would be inappropriate to classify case 3 as 
expectations management.20 
Based on pessimistic/optimistic forecasts, cases 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 16, and 17 are classified 
as expectations management. Case 15 is classified as expectations management based on 
pessimistic/optimistic forecasts but partitioned as a communication category in our classification. 
In contrast, case 4 is classified as expectations management in our classification but excluded 
from the expectations-management category when it is partitioned by pessimistic/optimistic 
forecasts. Table A-1 shows that about 20 percent of MEFs belongs to case 15 and about 7 
percent of MEFs belongs to case 4. To the extent that expectations managements are defined as 
managerial intention to meet or beat the market expectation at the time of earnings 
announcement, it is more appropriate to classify MEFs that guide down overly optimistic analyst 
forecasts and lead to actual earnings meeting the guided earnings numbers, as expectations 
management rather than communication.21 In case 15, management issues MEFs that are lower 
                                                 
20 Both good-news (cases 13, 14, 15) and bad-news (case 3) forecasts are classified as communication. While Lev 
and Penman (1990) argue that only managers with the information that implies firm values greater than the average 
valuation assumed by the market will disclose credibly, Skinner (1994, 1997) contends that managers have 
incentives to issue bad-news forecasts to prevent lawsuits. 
21  Consistent with prior literature (Bartov et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Richardson et al. 2004) that defines 
expectations managements as managerial intention to meet or beat the market expectation at the time of an earnings 
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than actual earnings but higher than the existing consensus forecasts. If a manager has an 
incentive for meeting or beating market expectations at the earnings announcement, leaving the 
current low market expectation unchanged could be a choice to help achieve the goal. Under 
such an incentive, managers are less likely to guide analysts’ forecasts upward. Rather, case 15 is 
consistent with managers providing earnings guidance to convey more accurate information 
about true earnings. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to classify case 15 as 
communication rather than expectations management. 
To the extent that an MEF that is lower than the consensus analysts’ forecast might be an 
unbiased belief, honestly held, expectations management based on our classification could 
represent the upper bound of the extent of expectations management. If an MEF that is lower 
than the existing consensus analysts’ forecast represents an unbiased belief of the manager at the 
time of guidance and therefore communication, managers with communication concerns are 
likely to revise MEFs upward when their previous beliefs turn out to be overly pessimistic. 
Untabulated results, however, show that upward revisions of MEFs before earnings 
announcements are quite rare. Specifically, we observe that less than 5 percent of MEFs are 
revised upward in the same quarter. Moreover, the percentage of MEFs that are followed by 
upward revisions is not significantly different across different incentive categories. We find that 
only 4.5 (5.5) percent of MEFs in the communication (expectations management) category are 
revised upward prior earnings announcements. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of 
some communicating MEFs being incorrectly classified as expectations management, it appears 
that the proportion of such misclassification is not significantly large.    
                                                                                                                                                             
announcement, we classify case 4 as expectations management. We replicate our analysis in Table 7 after 
classifying case 4 as communication instead of expectations management. The untabulated results are largely similar 
to those in Table 7, except that the coefficient on SELL_AF_30 becomes significant at the 5 percent level, and the 
coefficient on AFSTD is statistically insignificant when COMM is a dependent variable.   
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Figure A-1 Classification of management earnings forecasts – decision tree 
 
 Consensus AF vs. Actual  MEF vs. Consensus AF  MEF vs. Actual  MEFE vs. Consensus FE Cases Incentives 
    
 
Optimistic consensus 
(Consensus > Actual)  
Good-News MEF 
(MEF > Consensus)  
Optimistic MEF 
(MEF > Actual)  less accurate MEF  1 Other 
          
    
Confirming MEF 
(MEF = Consensus)  
Optimistic MEF 
(MEF > Actual)  same accuracy  2 Other 
          
   
Bad-News MEF 
(MEF < Consensus)  
Optimistic MEF 
(MEF > Actual)  more accurate MEF  3 Communication 
          
      
Accurate MEF 
(MEF = Actual)  more accurate MEF  4 Expectations Management 
          
     
Pessimistic MEF 
(MEF < Actual)  less accurate MEF  5 Expectations Management 
          
        same accuracy  6 Expectations Management 
          
       more accurate MEF  7 Expectations Management 
         
 
Accurate Consensus 
(Consensus = Actual)  
Good-News MEF 
(MEF > Consensus)  
Optimistic MEF 
(MEF > Actual)  less accurate MEF  8 Other 
          
    
Confirming MEF 
(MEF = Consensus)  
Accurate MEF 
(MEF = Actual)  same accuracy  9 Communication 
          
   
Bad-News MEF 
(MEF < Consensus)  
Pessimistic MEF 
(MEF < Actual)  less accurate MEF  10 Expectations Management 
         
 
Pessimistic Consensus 
(Consensus < Actual)  
Good-News MEF 
(MEF > Consensus)  
Optimistic MEF 
(MEF > Actual)  less accurate MEF  11 Other 
            
          same accuracy  12 Other 
            
         more accurate MEF  13 Communication 
           
       
Accurate MEF 
(MEF = Actual)  more accurate MEF  14 Communication 
          
      
Pessimistic MEF 
(MEF < Actual)  more accurate MEF  15 Communication 
          
    
Confirming MEF 
(MEF = Consensus)  
Pessimistic MEF 
(MEF < Actual)  same accuracy  16 Expectations Management 
          
   
Bad-News MEF 
(MEF < Consensus)  
Pessimistic MEF 
(MEF < Actual)  less accurate MEF  17 Expectations Management 
 
A condition is in bold characters where it automatically determines the subsequent nodes. 
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Figure A-2 Analysts’ forecast error, forecast news, management forecast error, and classification of management earnings forecasts 
 
Case # Possible Incentives   AF - Actual   MEF - AF   Actual - MEF   MEFE - AFE 
                    
1 Other   >   >0   <0   >0 
2 Other   >   =0   <0   =0 
3 Communication   >   <0   <0   <0 
4 Expectations management   >   <0   =0   <0 
5 Expectations management   >   <0   >0   >0 
6 Expectations management   >   <0   >0   =0 
7 Expectations management   >   <0   >0   <0 
8 Other   =   >0   <0   >0 
9 Communication   =   =0   =0   =0 
10 Expectations management   =   <0   >0   >0 
11 Other   <   >0   <0   >0 
12 Other   <   >0   <0   =0 
13 Communication   <   >0   <0   <0 
14 Communication   <   >0   =0   <0 
15 Communication   <   >0   >0   <0 
16 Expectations management   <   =0   >0   =0 
17 Expectations management   <   <0   >0   >0 
          
 
 
 AF = the last consensus analysts’ forecasts before MEF; MEF = the management forecast of earnings per share; Actual = actual earnings per share for the 
quarter or the fiscal year end; Good (Bad) news MEF = the difference between MEF and AF is positive (negative), measured as MEF- consensus analysts’ 
forecasts before MEF; MEFE = management earnings forecasts error, measured as (Actual EPS – MEF)/P, where P is the stock price at the end of the day prior 
to MEF; AFE = forecast error of the last consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to MEF, measured as (Actual EPS – Consensus Forecasts)/P, where Consensus 
Forecasts is the last consensus analysts’ forecasts of EPS  before MEF, and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to MEF. 
The point estimate of earnings is used to proxy for MEF when management issues a point forecast. For range forecasts, we use the midpoint of the range.  For 
minimum- and maximum-type forecasts, we use the disclosed lower or upper bound. 
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Figure A-3 Example of 17 cases and alternative classifications of management earnings forecasts 
 
16
15
14 MEF
13
12 AF AF & MEF AF AF AF AF AF
11 MEF MEF
10 MEF AF AF & MEF
9 MEF
8 MEF
7 MEF
6
5
17 Cases 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Bad/good news Bad N Bad N Bad N Bad N Bad N
Pessimistic/optimistic PESSIM PESSIM PESSIM
NEW classification OTHER OTHER COMM EX_MGT EX_MGT EX_MGT EX_MGT OTHER COMM
16
15
14
13 MEF
12 MEF
11 MEF
10 AF MEF
9 MEF MEF
8 AF AF AF AF AF AF & MEF AF
7
6 MEF
5
17 Cases 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Bad/good news Bad N Bad N
Pessimistic/optimistic PESSIM PESSIM PESSIM PESSIM
NEW classification EX_MGT OTHER OTHER COMM COMM COMM EX_MGT EX_MGT  
 
Bad N: bad-news forecasts, PESSIM: pessimistic forecast, OTHER: Other incentives, COMM: Communication incentive, EX_MGT: Expectations 
management incentive 
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Table A-1 Frequencies of management earnings forecasts by 17 cases and three possible incentives 
 
    Pre-Reg FD Period Post-Reg FD Period First forecast Final forecast 
Incentives:  # of # of # of  # of # of
  Case forecasts Percent forecasts Percent forecasts Percent forecasts Percent forecasts Percent 
Expectations management     
 No. 4 1,634 7.17% 465 11.31% 997 5.85% 1,363 7.22% 1,555 8.21%
 5 666 2.92% 69 1.68% 571 3.35% 594 3.15% 589 3.11%
 6 110 0.48% 12 0.29% 91 0.53% 93 0.49% 99 0.52%
 7 3,410 14.97% 801 19.48% 2,316 13.59% 2,880 15.25% 3,204 16.91%
 10 1,200 5.27% 153 3.72% 998 5.86% 991 5.25% 1,040 5.49%
 16 1,392 6.11% 189 4.60% 1,109 6.51% 1,073 5.68% 1,131 5.97%
 17 2,493 10.94% 191 4.65% 2,220 13.03% 2,059 10.90% 1,941 10.25%
 Total 10,905 47.86% 1,880 45.73% 8,302 48.72% 9,053 47.94% 9,559 50.46%
Communication   
 No. 3 4,453 19.54% 1,227 29.85% 2,799 16.43% 3,967 21.01% 3,386 17.87%
 9 581 2.55% 106 2.58% 423 2.48% 440 2.33% 518 2.73%
 13 242 1.06% 32 0.78% 194 1.14% 195 1.03% 209 1.10%
 14 470 2.06% 70 1.70% 367 2.15% 356 1.89% 438 2.31%
 15 4,479 19.66% 441 10.73% 3,774 22.15% 3,499 18.53% 3,700 19.53%
 Total 10,225 44.88% 1,876 45.63% 7,557 44.35% 8,457 44.78% 8,251 43.56%
Other    
 No. 1 682 2.99% 141 3.43% 491 2.88% 580 3.07% 434 2.29%
 2 470 2.06% 138 3.36% 291 1.71% 404 2.14% 297 1.57%
 8 348 1.53% 55 1.34% 275 1.61% 269 1.42% 286 1.51%
 11 138 0.61% 19 0.46% 110 0.65% 107 0.57% 102 0.54%
 12 17 0.07% 2 0.05% 14 0.08% 15 0.08% 14 0.07%
 Total 1,655 7.26% 355 8.64% 1,181 6.93% 1,375 7.28% 1,133 5.98%
Total observations  22,785 100.00% 4,111 100.00% 17,040 100.00% 18,885 100.00% 18,943 100.00%
 
The number of observations is restricted by availability of data on various variables because we need to know management earnings forecast error, news (good vs. 
bad news), and forecast error of consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to MEF in order to define three incentives. We divide our sample between the Pre- and Post-
Regulation FD periods, based on whether the MEF is released before or after year 2000. We exclude year 2000 from both the pre- and post-Regulation FD 
periods because year 2000 is the transition period. 
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Figure 1 Percentage of MEF Incentives 
 
Panel A: Percentage of expectations management defined by bad-news MEF 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
Forecast Horizon
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f M
EF
 In
ce
nt
iv
e
Good and No
News MEF
Bad News MEF:
Expectations
Management
 
 
 
Panel B: Percentage of expectations management defined by MEF error 
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Figure 1 continued 
 
Panel C: Percentage of MEF incentives after partitioning by new scheme 
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In Panel A, good (bad) news is defined based on the difference between MEF and AF. If (MEF – consensus 
analysts’ forecasts before MEF) is positive then it is defined as good news, and if the measure is negative or equal to 
zero, then it is defined as bad news.  
 
In Panel B, positive (negative) MEF error indicates MEF is smaller (greater) than actual EPS. If (Actual EPS – 
MEF)/P, where P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to MEF, is positive, then it is defined as positive MEF 
error, and if the measure is negative or zero, then it is defined as negative news.  
 
In Panel C, MEFs are classified into three incentive categories based on forecast news, optimism/pessimism in 
management forecast, and MEF error. 
 
Forecast horizon is the number of weeks prior to earnings announcement. 
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Table 1 Frequencies of management earnings forecasts  
 
Panel A: Frequencies of management earnings forecasts by year 
 
Year Quantitative  Percentage Qualitative Percentage Total
1995 323 96.71% 11 3.29% 334
1996 564 91.11% 55 8.89% 619
1997 760 88.06% 103 11.94% 863
1998 1,304 76.80% 394 23.20% 1,698
1999 1,255 71.55% 499 28.45% 1,754
2000 1,682 80.90% 397 19.10% 2,079
2001 3,684 89.61% 427 10.39% 4,111
2002 3,545 93.88% 231 6.12% 3,776
2003 3,405 95.67% 154 4.33% 3,559
2004 3,680 98.16% 69 1.84% 3,749
2005 3,145 99.43% 18 0.57% 3,163
 23,347  2,358  25,705
 
  
 
Panel B:  Number of firms issuing management earnings forecasts  
 
Year Number of firms  Number of forecasts # of forecasts per firm 
1995 328 334 1.02
1996 598 619 1.04
1997 811 863 1.06
1998 1,572 1,698 1.08
1999 1,615 1,754 1.09
2000 1,890 2,079 1.10
2001 3,349 4,111 1.23
2002 3,002 3,776 1.26
2003 2,815 3,559 1.26
2004 2,940 3,749 1.28
2005 2,553 3,163 1.24
 21,473 25,705 1.20
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Table 2 Forecast errors of management earnings forecasts and analysts’ forecasts by year 
 
Panel A: Management earnings forecast errors 
  
Year N Mean  Median Std. dev. Min  Max 
1995 317 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0058 -0.0391 0.0185
1996 540 -0.0022 0.0000 0.0073 -0.0418 0.0182
1997 734 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0068 -0.0424 0.0182
1998 1,280 -0.0013 0.0000 0.0065 -0.0424 0.0212
1999 1,216 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0051 -0.0400 0.0202
2000 1,625 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0062 -0.0436 0.0213
2001 3,581 0.0000 0.0002 0.0057 -0.0433 0.0206
2002 3,464 0.0005 0.0005 0.0048 -0.0436 0.0211
2003 3,365 0.0005 0.0006 0.0049 -0.0431 0.0213
2004 3,652 0.0007 0.0006 0.0042 -0.0436 0.0210
2005 3,107 0.0007 0.0006 0.0041 -0.0385 0.0205
Total  22,881      
 
 
Panel B: Forecast errors of consensus analysts’ forecasts issued prior to management earnings 
forecasts 
   
Year N Mean  Median Std. dev. Min  Max 
1995 316 -0.0059 -0.0021 0.0155 -0.1644 0.0621
1996 540 -0.0092 -0.0037 0.0258 -0.3255 0.1297
1997 733 -0.0082 -0.0037 0.0200 -0.4133 0.0200
1998 1,279 -0.0082 -0.0036 0.0196 -0.3600 0.1120
1999 1,207 -0.0087 -0.0030 0.0258 -0.4776 0.0424
2000 1,615 -0.0082 -0.0022 0.0298 -0.9219 0.0760
2001 3,561 -0.0051 -0.0013 0.0201 -0.5224 0.1411
2002 3,443 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0112 -0.1659 0.0741
2003 3,350 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0097 -0.1487 0.0784
2004 3,642 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0071 -0.0785 0.0355
2005 3,099 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0076 -0.0775 0.1985
Total  22,785      
 
The sample was truncated at the 1% and 99% of MEF errors and includes only quantitative MEFs.  
In Panel A, management earnings forecast errors are measured as (Actual EPS – MEF)/P, where MEF is the 
management forecast of earnings per share and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to MEF. The point 
estimate of earnings is used for MEF when management issues a point forecast. For range forecasts, we use the 
midpoint of the range. For minimum- and maximum-type forecasts, we use the disclosed lower or upper bound. 
Positive (negative) value of MEFE means pessimistic (optimistic) MEF.  In Panel B, forecast errors of consensus 
analysts’ forecasts are measured as (Actual EPS – Consensus Forecasts)/P, where Consensus Forecasts is the last 
consensus analysts’ forecasts of EPS before MEF, and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to MEF. A 
positive (negative) value indicates pessimistic (optimistic) analysts’ forecasts.  
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of selected variables  
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std dev. 25th  75th  t-value Pr > |t| Pr > S
MEFE 22881 0.0001 0.0004 0.0052 -0.0002 0.0015 3.38 0.0007 <.0001
ABSMEFE 22881 0.0026 0.0010 0.0045 0.0003 0.0028 87.01 <.0001 <.0001
NEWS 22785 -0.0036 -0.0006 0.0155 -0.0038 0.0002 -35.24 <.0001 <.0001
B_AFE  22785 -0.0035 -0.0002 0.0165 -0.0045 0.0013 -31.99 <.0001 <.0001
A_AFE  22688 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0140 -0.0004 0.0014 -3.91 <.0001 <.0001
CHG_AFE  22593 0.0029 0.0002 0.0117 0.0000 0.0030 37.35 <.0001 <.0001
ABSCHG_AFE 22593 -0.0032 -0.0006 0.0109 -0.0030 0.0000 -43.56 <.0001 <.0001
 
 
Panel B: Meeting/beating versus missing analysts expectations 
 
          Beating vs. Missing Meeting vs. Missing 
 Beating expectation Meeting expectation Missing expectation 
t-test: Wilcoxon 
test 
t-test: Wilcoxon 
test 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Pr > |t| Pr > |Z| Pr > |t| Pr > |Z| 
MEFE 11,687 0.0016 0.0011 5,687 -0.0004 0.0000 3,084 -0.0040 -0.0013 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ABSMEFE 11,687 0.0026 0.0013 5,687 0.0012 0.0003 3,084 0.0045 0.0016 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
NEWS 11,633 -0.0024 -0.0002 5,681 -0.0034 -0.0007 3,069 -0.0081 -0.0025 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
B_AFE  11,633 -0.0008 0.0006 5,681 -0.0038 -0.0008 3,069 -0.0120 -0.0056 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
A_AFE  11,683 0.0014 0.0010 5,683 -0.0009 0.0000 3,082 -0.0065 -0.0021 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CHG_AFE  11,629 0.0022 0.0000 5,677 0.0029 0.0004 3,067 0.0057 0.0016 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ABSCHG_AFE 11,629 -0.0023 -0.0003 5,677 -0.0035 -0.0009 3,067 -0.0060 -0.0018 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 3 continued 
 
Panel C: Initial analysts’ forecast optimism versus pessimism 
 
 Initial consensus forecasts Pessimistic vs. Optimistic 
 Pessimistic  Accurate Optimistic t-test: Wilcoxon test 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Pr > |t| Pr > |Z|
MEFE 8,745 0.0022 0.0013 2,201 0.0003 0.0001 9,695 -0.0017 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
ABSMEFE 8,745 0.0025 0.0013 2,201 0.0009 0.0003 9,695 0.0030 0.0009 <.0001 <.0001
NEWS 8,697 0.0006 0.0001 2,191 -0.0012 -0.0002 9,673 -0.0081 -0.0032 <.0001 <.0001
B_AFE 8,697 0.0028 0.0016 2,191 -0.0009 0.0000 9,673 -0.0098 -0.0044 <.0001 <.0001
A_AFE  8,720 0.0025 0.0013 2,197 0.0002 0.0000 9,617 -0.0033 -0.0005 <.0001 <.0001
CHG_AFE  8,672 -0.0003 0.0000 2,187 0.0011 0.0000 9,596 0.0063 0.0025 <.0001 <.0001
ABSCHG_AFE 8,672 -0.0011 0.0000 2,187 -0.0011 0.0000 9,596 -0.0056 -0.0020 <.0001 <.0001
 
   
Panel D: Pre- versus post-regulation FD period 
 
   Pre- vs. Post-Reg FD Period 
 Pre-Reg FD Period Post-Reg FD Period t-test: Wilcoxon test
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Pr > |t| Pr > |Z|
MEFE 4,122 -0.0018 0.0000 17,111 0.0006 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001
ABSMEFE 4,122 0.0036 0.0009 17,111 0.0024 0.0010 <.0001 <.0001
NEWS 4,111 -0.0071 -0.0024 17,040 -0.0024 -0.0004 <.0001 <.0001
B_AFE  4,111 -0.0089 -0.0035 17,040 -0.0018 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
A_AFE  4,077 -0.0029 0.0000 17,013 0.0004 0.0004 <.0001 <.0001
CHG_AFE  4,066 0.0060 0.0017 16,943 0.0020 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
ABSCHG_AFE 4,066 -0.0060 -0.0018 16,943 -0.0023 -0.0004 <.0001 <.0001
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Table 3 continued 
 
The sample is truncated at the 1% and 99% of MEF errors and includes only quantitative MEFs.  
MEFE = MEF error, measured as (Actual EPS – MEF)/P, where MEF is the management forecast of earnings per share, and P is the stock price at the end of the 
day prior to MEF. The point estimate of earnings is used for MEF when management issues a point forecast. For range forecasts, we use the midpoint of 
the range. For minimum- and maximum-type forecasts, we use the disclosed lower or upper bound. Positive (negative) value of MEFE means 
pessimistic (optimistic) MEF.  
ABSMEFE = the absolute value of MEFE.   
NEWS = MEF news calculated as (MEF – Consensus Forecasts)/P, where Consensus Forecasts is the last consensus analysts’ forecasts of EPS  prior to MEF, 
and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to MEF. Consensus analysts’ forecast is measured as median analysts’ forecasts. Positive (negative) 
value of NEWS indicates good (bad) news.  
B_AFE (A_AFE) = forecast error of the last (first) consensus analysts’ forecasts before (after) MEF, measured as (Actual EPS – Consensus Forecasts)/P,  where 
Consensus Forecasts is the last (first) consensus analysts’ forecasts of EPS before (after) MEF, and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to 
MEF. A positive (negative) value of B_AFE or A_AFE indicates pessimistic (optimistic) analysts’ forecasts.  
CHG_AFE = change in analysts’ forecast errors before and after MEF, measured as A_AFE minus B_AFE.  Positive (negative) value of CHG_AFE indicates 
lower (higher) analysts’ forecasts after MEF.   
ABSCHG_AFE = change in the absolute value of analyst forecast errors before and after MEF, measured as the absolute value of A_AFE minus the absolute 
value of B_AFE.  Positive (negative) value of ABSCHG_AFE indicates less (more) accurate analysts’ forecasts after MEFs.  
 
The number of observations in Panel A is different from the sum of the number of observations in other Panels because we cannot determine meeting/beating or 
analyst forecast optimism due to missing variables for several observations. For example, in Panel B, we cannot determine whether actual earnings meet or beat 
expectations because the last consensus forecasts prior to actual earnings announcement are missing for several observations. 
 
In Panel B, significance levels are for two-tailed t-tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) for differences in means (medians) between meeting/beating expectation 
sample and missing expectation sample.  In Panel C, significance levels are for two-tailed t-tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) for differences in means (medians) 
between pessimism and optimism in initial analysts’ forecasts. In Panel D, we divide our sample between the Pre- and Post-Regulation FD periods, based on 
whether the MEF is released before or after year 2000. We exclude year 2000 from both pre- and post-Regulation FD periods because year 2000 is the transition 
period. Significance levels are for two-tailed t-tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) for differences in means (medians) between pre- and post-Regulation FD periods. 
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Table 4 Frequencies of management earnings forecasts by three possible incentives 
 
    Pre-Reg FD Period Post-Reg FD Period  First forecast Final forecast 
Incentives: # of   # of  # of   # of  # of  
  forecasts Percent  forecasts Percent forecasts Percent  forecasts Percent forecasts Percent 
Expectations management   10,905 47.86%  1,880 45.73% 8,302 48.72%  9,053 47.94% 9,559 50.46%
Communication 10,225 44.88%  1,876 45.63% 7,557 44.35%  8,457 44.78% 8,251 43.56%
Other  1,655 7.26%  355 8.64% 1,181 6.93%  1,375 7.28% 1,133 5.98%
Total observations 22,785 100.00%  4,111 100.00% 17,040 100.00%  18,885 100.00% 18,943 100.00%
 
Based on AF, MEF, and actual earnings, the sample MEFs are grouped into the following three possible incentives: (1) Expectations management, (2) 
Communication, and (3) Other.  
  
The number of observations is restricted by availability of data on various variables because we need to know management earnings forecast error, news (good vs. 
bad news), and forecast error of consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to MEF in order to define three incentives. We divide our sample between the Pre- and Post-
Regulation FD periods, based on whether the MEF is released before or after year 2000. We exclude year 2000 from both the pre- and post-Regulation FD 
periods because year 2000 is the transition period. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics by three possible incentives for issuing management earnings 
forecasts 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
Variable Incentive N Mean Median Std. dev. t-value Pr > |t|
METBEAT            
 1 9,785 0.9537 1.0000 0.2101 448.95 <.0001
 2 9,172 0.7727 1.0000 0.4191 176.56 <.0001
 3 1,426 0.6276 1.0000 0.4836 49.01 <.0001
I_AF_OP            
 1 9,867 0.4627 0.0000 0.4986 92.17 <.0001
 2 9,259 0.4393 0.0000 0.4963 85.16 <.0001
 3 1,435 0.7254 1.0000 0.4465 61.55 <.0001
MEFE        
  1 10,905 0.0019 0.0009 0.0029 67.64 <.0001
  2 10,225 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0055 -14.01 <.0001
  3 1,655 -0.0060 -0.0028 0.0081 -30.13 <.0001
ABSMEFE        
  1 10,905 0.0019 0.0009 0.0029 67.64 <.0001
  2 10,225 0.0028 0.0011 0.0048 59.07 <.0001
  3 1,655 0.0060 0.0028 0.0081 30.13 <.0001
B_AFE         
  1 10,819 -0.0036 -0.0004 0.0151 -26.25 <.0001
  2 10,126 -0.0030 0.0003 0.0189 -16.80 <.0001
  3 1,648 -0.0038 -0.0011 0.0068 -22.79 <.0001
A_AFE        
  1 10,819 0.0004 0.0005 0.0082 5.01 <.0001
  2 10,126 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0084 -11.01 <.0001
  3 1,648 -0.0029 -0.0008 0.0068 -17.47 <.0001
CHG_AFE         
  1 10,819 0.0040 0.0009 0.0121 34.60 <.0001
  2 10,126 0.0021 0.0000 0.0120 17.30 <.0001
  3 1,648 0.0009 0.0000 0.0048 7.24 <.0001
ABSCHG_AFE        
  1 10,819 -0.0027 0.0000 0.0112 -25.39 <.0001
 2 10,126 -0.0040 -0.0012 0.0113 -36.19 <.0001
 3 1,648 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0045 -5.22 <.0001
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Table 5 continued 
 
Panel B: Pre- versus post-regulation FD period 
 
  Pre-Reg FD Period Post-Reg FD Period t-test: Wilcoxon test: 
Variable Incentive N Mean Median N Mean Median Pr > |t| Pr > |Z| 
METBEAT 1 1,689 0.9153 1.0000 7,469 0.9606 1.0000 <.0001 <.0001
 2 1,671 0.6092 1.0000 6,798 0.8138 1.0000 <.0001 <.0001
 3 314 0.6338 1.0000 1,007 0.6256 1.0000 0.5811 0.5810
I_AF_OP               
 1 1,704 0.6796 1.0000 7,507 0.3960 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
 2 1,687 0.6562 1.0000 6,846 0.3732 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
 3 315 0.7873 1.0000 1,013 0.7068 1.0000 0.0162 0.0163
MEFE               
 1 1,880 0.0015 0.0006 8,302 0.0020 0.0009 <.0001 <.0001
  2 1,876 -0.0034 -0.0006 7,557 -0.0001 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
  3 355 -0.0110 -0.0057 1,181 -0.0044 -0.0023 <.0001 <.0001
ABSMEFE               
 1 1,880 0.0015 0.0006 8,302 0.0020 0.0009 <.0001 <.0001
  2 1,876 0.0042 0.0012 7,557 0.0024 0.0011 <.0001 0.0023
  3 355 0.0110 0.0057 1,181 0.0044 0.0023 <.0001 <.0001
B_AFE          
 1 1,866 -0.0079 -0.0030 8,258 -0.0024 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
  2 1,848 -0.0102 -0.0042 7,506 -0.0009 0.0008 <.0001 <.0001
  3 352 -0.0075 -0.0031 1,179 -0.0026 -0.0008 <.0001 <.0001
A_AFE         
 1 1,866 -0.0016 0.0000 8,258 0.0009 0.0006 <.0001 <.0001
  2 1,848 -0.0041 -0.0003 7,506 -0.0001 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001
  3 352 -0.0038 -0.0007 1,179 -0.0025 -0.0008 0.7436 0.3870
CHG_AFE         
 1 1,866 0.0063 0.0022 8,258 0.0033 0.0007 <.0001 <.0001
  2 1,848 0.0061 0.0015 7,506 0.0008 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
  3 352 0.0037 0.0006 1,179 0.0001 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
ABSCHG_AFE        
 1 1,866 -0.0053 -0.0015 8,258 -0.0019 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
 2 1,848 -0.0074 -0.0025 7,506 -0.0030 -0.0010 <.0001 <.0001
 3 352 -0.0025 -0.0004 1,179 -0.0001 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001
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Table 5 continued 
 
Three possible incentives for issuing MEFs are 
  1 = Expectations management 
  2 = Communication 
       3 = Other  
 
METBEAT = an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if actual EPS is greater than or equal to the last consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to earnings 
announcement and 0 otherwise, where consensus analysts’ forecasts is defined as the median of analysts’ forecasts; 
I_AF_OP = an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the initial consensus analysts’ forecasts is optimistic (greater than actual EPS) and 0 otherwise, where 
the consensus forecasts is defined as the median of analysts’ forecasts;  
MEFE = MEF error measured as (Actual EPS – MEF)/P, where MEF is the management forecast of earnings per share, and P is the stock price at the end of the 
day prior to MEF. The point estimate of earnings is used for MEF when management issues a point forecast. For range forecasts, we use the midpoint of 
the range. For minimum- and maximum-type forecasts, we use the disclosed lower or upper bound. Positive (negative) value of MEFE means 
pessimistic (optimistic) MEF; 
ABSMEFE = the absolute value of MEFE;    
B_AFE (A_AFE) = forecast error of the last (first) consensus analysts’ forecasts before (after) MEF, measured as (Actual EPS – Consensus Forecasts)/P, where 
Consensus Forecasts is the last (first) consensus analysts’ forecasts of EPS  before (after) MEF, and P is the stock price at the end of the day prior to 
MEF. A positive (negative) value of B_AFE or A_AFE indicates pessimistic (optimistic) analysts’ forecasts; 
CHG_AFE = change in analysts’ forecast errors before and after MEF, measured as A_AFE minus B_AFE.  Positive (negative) value of CHG_AFE indicates 
lower (higher) analysts’ forecasts after MEF; and   
ABSCHG_AFE = change in the absolute value of analyst forecast errors before and after MEF, measured as the absolute value of A_AFE minus the absolute 
value of B_AFE.  Positive (negative) value of ABSCHG_AFE indicates less (more) accurate analysts’ forecasts after MEFs.  
 
In Panel B, we divide our sample between the Pre- and Post-Regulation FD periods, based on whether the MEF is released before or after year 2000. We exclude 
year 2000 from both the pre- and post-Regulation FD periods because year 2000 is the transition period. 
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics for equity offerings and insider trading - by three possible 
incentives for issuing MEFs 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
Variable Incentive N Mean Median Std. dev. t-value Pr > |t|
EO_AF_30            
 1 10,905 0.0078 0.0000 0.0879 9.26 0.0000
 2 10,225 0.0088 0.0000 0.0934 9.53 0.0000
 3 1,655 0.0036 0.0000 0.0601 2.45 0.0143
EO_AF_1YR       
 1 10,905 0.0499 0.0000 0.2177 23.93 <.0001
 2 10,225 0.0536 0.0000 0.2252 24.06 <.0001
 3 1,655 0.0381 0.0000 0.1914 8.09 <.0001
SELL_AF_30   
  1 10,905 0.2642 0.0000 0.4409 62.57 <.0001
  2 10,225 0.2660 0.0000 0.4419 60.87 <.0001
  3 1,655 0.2006 0.0000 0.4006 20.37 <.0001
SELL_AF_1YR   
  1 10,905 0.5629 1.0000 0.4961 118.49 <.0001
  2 10,225 0.5638 1.0000 0.4959 114.96 <.0001
  3 1,655 0.5094 1.0000 0.5001 41.44 <.0001
 
 
Panel B: Pre- versus post-regulation FD period 
 
        Difference Tests: 
  Pre-Reg FD Period Post-Reg FD Period 
 
t-test 
Wilcox-
on test 
Variables Incentives  N Mean Median N Mean Median Pr > |t| Pr > |Z| 
EO_AF_30               
 1 1,880 0.0053 0.0000 8,302 0.0087 0.0000 0.1384 0.1384 
 2 1,876 0.0059 0.0000 7,557 0.0094 0.0000 0.2374 0.2374 
 3 355 0.0028 0.0000 1,181 0.0042 0.0000 0.7666 0.7670 
EO_AF_1YR              
 1 1,880 0.0367 0.0000 8,302 0.0540 0.0000 0.0020 0.0020 
 2 1,876 0.0373 0.0000 7,557 0.0580 0.0000 0.0012 0.0012 
 3 355 0.0113 0.0000 1,181 0.0457 0.0000 0.0054 0.0054 
SELL_AF_30          
  1 1,880 0.1202 0.0000 8,302 0.3033 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
  2 1,876 0.1493 0.0000 7,557 0.3026 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
  3 355 0.0986 0.0000 1,181 0.2303 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
SELL_AF_1YR          
  1 1,880 0.4043 0.0000 8,302 0.6052 1.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
  2 1,876 0.4179 0.0000 7,557 0.5997 1.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
  3 355 0.3859 0.0000 1,181 0.5470 1.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 6 continued 
 
Three possible incentives for issuing MEFs are 
  1 = Expectations management 
  2 = Communication 
       3 = Other 
 
EO_AF_30 = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has common or preferred equity offerings 
between the earnings announcement date and 30 days after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. 
EO_AF_1YR = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has common or preferred equity offerings between the 
earnings announcement date and 1 year after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. 
SELL_AF_30 = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if directors and officers are net sellers between the 
earnings announcement date and 30 days after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. 
SELL_AF_1YR = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if directors and officers are net sellers between the 
earnings announcement date and 1 year after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. 
 
In Panel B, we divide our sample between the Pre- and Post-Regulation FD periods, based on whether the MEF is 
released before or after year 2000. We exclude year 2000 from both the pre- and post- Regulation FD periods 
because year 2000 is the transition period. Significance levels are for two-tailed t-tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) for 
differences in means (medians) between the pre- and post-Regulation FD periods. 
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Table 7 Logistic regression analyses — three incentives for issuing management earnings forecasts 
 
 Pr(MEF_INCENTIVE =1) = α0 + α1SELL_AF_30 + α2EO_AF_30 + α3 EO_BF + α4 MB + α5MV + α6PROFIT 
+ α7YEAR + α8R&D + α9LITG + α10IMPLIT + α11CHEARN + α12LABINT + α13LT_CHEARN 
+ α14AFSTD + α15ARSTD + ε            
 
Dep. Variable EX_MGT  COMM  OTHER  
 Coeff. Est. Chi-sq Coeff. Est. Chi-sq  Coeff. Est. Chi-sq
Intercept -0.4515 16.62 *** 0.0491 0.19   -2.1679 115.76 *** 
SELL_AF_30  0.0923 7.14 *** -0.0068 0.04  -0.3153 21.18 *** 
EO_AF_30  -0.0548 0.11   0.1888 1.34   -0.6586 2.45  
EO_BF 0.0979 0.51  -0.1824 1.68  0.2597 1.20  
MB 0.0001 0.02  0.0000 0.11  -0.0004 0.30  
MV 0.0012 0.01   0.0001 0.00   -0.0027 0.02  
PROFIT  0.1752 13.14 *** -0.2070 17.94 *** 0.0816 0.86  
YEAR  0.0387 34.34 *** -0.0396 34.96 *** -0.0017 0.02  
R&D 3.4314 12.26 *** -3.1375 9.61 *** -1.4509 0.66  
LITG 0.2775 66.85 *** -0.3987 130.00 *** 0.3415 31.47 *** 
IMPLIT -0.0448 1.81   0.0677 4.00 ** -0.0731 1.37  
CHEARN  0.0177 0.31   0.0466 2.10  -0.2097 13.11 *** 
LABINT 0.1282 4.55 ** -0.0461 0.57   -0.2848 6.76 *** 
LT_CHEARN  -0.0720 0.34  -0.0094 0.01  0.2002 1.70  
AFSTD -1.7305 11.10 *** 1.7064 10.84 *** 0.1530 0.03  
ARSTD -4.1145 13.95 *** 4.7626 18.33 *** -1.4530 0.51  
       
Likelihood Ratio 238.39  293.68  88.94  
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Table 7 continued 
 
MEF_INCENTIVE is an indicator variable representing three incentives for issuing MEFs as follows: 
 EX_MGT takes a value of 1 if MEF belongs to the category representing the Expectations-management incentive and 0 otherwise; 
 COMM takes a value of 1 if MEF belongs to the category representing the Communication incentive and 0 otherwise; and 
      OTHER takes a value of 1 if MEF belongs to the category representing the Other incentive and 0 otherwise. 
 
SELL_AF_30 = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if directors and officers are net sellers between the earnings announcement date and 30 days after the 
earnings announcement and 0 otherwise; 
EO_AF_30 = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has common or preferred equity offerings between the earnings announcement date and 30 days after the 
earnings announcement and 0 otherwise; 
EO_BF= an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has common or preferred equity offerings between the MEF date and the day before the earnings 
announcement and 0 otherwise; 
MB= market-to-book equity at the end of the quarter prior to MEF; 
MV= logarithm of market value of equity at the end of the quarter prior to MEF; 
PROFIT = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if actual EPS is positive and 0 otherwise;   
YEAR = time trend variable, defined as (MEF year-1995); 
R&D = R&D expense scaled by average total assets; 
LITG = industry dummy with high litigation risk based on 4-digit SIC industry code, such as 2833, 2836, 3570, 3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374;     
IMPLIT = industry dummy with high implicit claims based on 4-digit SIC industry code, such as 1500-1799, 2450-2459,2500-2599, 2830-2839, 3010-3019, 
3240-3999;  
CHEARN = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the change in earnings from the same quarter in the previous year is positive and 0 otherwise;  
LABINT= labor intensity, measured as [1-(PPE/Gross Assets)] where PPE is gross property plant, and equipment and Gross Assets is (total assets+accumulated 
depreciation and amortization);   
LT_CHEARN = long-term change in earnings from 4 quarters prior to the forecast quarter to 4 quarters after the forecast quarter scaled by the market value of 
equity at 4 quarters prior to the forecast quarter;   
AFSTD = standard deviation of analyst forecasts included in the last consensus forecast prior to MEF; and 
ARSTD = standard deviation of abnormal stock returns prior to MEF, measured over trading days (-27 to -2) around MEF. 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
 55
Table 8 Logistic regression analyses – using alternative classification of management earnings 
forecasts 
 
Panel A: Classification based on bad/good news forecasts   
 
Pr(Bad-News Forecast =1) = α0 + α1SELL_AF_30 + α2EO_AF_30 + α3 EO_BF + α4 MB 
+ α5MV + α6PROFIT + α7YEAR + α8R&D + α9LITG + α10IMPLIT  
                        + α11CHEARN + α12LABINT + α13LT_CHEARN + α14AFSTD 
                        + α15ARSTD + ε            
                
 Coeff. Est. Chi-sq 
Intercept 2.4790 390.30 *** 
SELL_AF_30  -0.2283 39.51 *** 
EO_AF_30  -0.6203 13.19 *** 
EO_BF -0.4609 10.73 *** 
MB 0.0001 0.01  
MV -0.0600 31.04 *** 
PROFIT  -0.7248 140.66 *** 
YEAR  -0.0183 6.35 ** 
R&D 0.3603 0.11   
LITG 0.2636 50.90 *** 
IMPLIT 0.0707 3.77 *  
CHEARN  -1.0064 838.74 *** 
LABINT 0.1129 3.04  * 
LT_CHEARN  -0.2167 2.00  
AFSTD 0.3253 0.76   
ARSTD -8.3366 53.85 *** 
   
Likelihood Ratio 1,673.58  
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Table 8 continued 
 
Panel B: Classification based on pessimistic/optimistic forecasts  
 
Pr(Pessimistic Forecast =1) = α0 + α1SELL_AF_30 + α2EO_AF_30 + α3 EO_BF + α4 MB 
+ α5MV + α6PROFIT + α7YEAR + α8R&D + α9LITG + α10IMPLIT  
                        + α11CHEARN + α12LABINT + α13LT_CHEARN + α14AFSTD 
                        + α15ARSTD + ε            
                
 Coeff. Est. Chi-sq 
Intercept -1.1014 94.19 *** 
SELL_AF_30  0.4328 133.85 *** 
EO_AF_30  1.0862 23.82 *** 
EO_BF 0.5140 10.15 *** 
MB 0.0001 0.26  
MV -0.0071 0.46  
PROFIT  0.4776 91.66 *** 
YEAR  0.0813 139.71 *** 
R&D 4.3037 17.81 *** 
LITG -0.3417 93.72 ***  
IMPLIT -0.0521 2.19   
CHEARN  0.8432 660.20 *** 
LABINT 0.0824 1.70   
LT_CHEARN  0.1755 1.02  
AFSTD 0.9068 7.90 *** 
ARSTD -0.1124 0.01   
    
Likelihood Ratio 1,722.50  
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Table 8 continued 
 
In panel A, Bad-News Forecast takes a value of 1 if MEF < AF and 0 otherwise. 
In Panel B, Pessimistic Forecast takes a value of 1 if MEF < Actual and 0 otherwise. 
 
SELL_AF_30 = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if directors and officers are net sellers between the 
earnings announcement date and 30 days after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise; 
EO_AF_30 = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has common or preferred equity offerings between the 
earnings announcement date and 30 days after the earnings announcement and 0 otherwise; 
EO_BF= an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has common or preferred equity offerings between MEF date 
and the day before earnings announcement and 0 otherwise; 
MB= market-to-book equity at the end of the quarter prior to MEF; 
MV= logarithm of market value of equity at the end of the quarter prior to MEF; 
PROFIT = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if actual EPS is positive and 0 otherwise;   
YEAR = time trend variable, defined as (MEF year-1995); 
R&D = R & D expense scaled by average total assets; 
LITG = industry dummy with high litigation risk based on 4-digit SIC industry code, such as 2833, 2836, 3570, 
3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374;     
IMPLIT = industry dummy with high implicit claims based on 4-digit SIC industry code, such as 1500-1799, 2450-
2459,2500-2599, 2830-2839, 3010-3019, 3240-3999;  
CHEARN = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the change in earnings from the same quarter in the 
previous year is positive and 0 otherwise;  
LABINT= labor intensity, measured as [1-(PPE/Gross Assets)] where PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment 
and Gross Assets is (total assets + accumulated depreciation and amortization);   
LT_CHEARN = long-term change in earnings from 4 quarters prior to the forecast quarter to 4 quarters after the 
forecast quarter scaled by the market value of equity at 4 quarters prior to the forecast quarter; 
AFSTD = standard deviation of analyst forecasts included in the last consensus forecast prior to MEF; and 
ARSTD = standard deviation of abnormal stock returns prior to MEF, measured over trading days (-27 to -2) around 
MEF. 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
